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According to all sorts of forecasts, the current political autumn is going to be immensely tense. On the
one hand, the MPs are expected to deal with at least 349 draft bills, including 84 that have already been
prepared for their scrutiny. On the other hand, the current political season, as the logic of recent
developments suggest, is bound to evolve in the environment of a political intrigue linked to
expectations of implementation of the April 2000 referendum results and making amendments to the
constitution.
Yet, surprisingly, the controversy over the implementation that had shaken the Ukrainian policy-
making and policy-commenting communities has moved back from the spotlight recently. Instead,
increasing significance is gained by a multi-faceted process of debating the draft bill "On the State
Budget of Ukraine for the Year of 2001" and a number of other economic bills, including the Taxation
Code. Officials of the Cabinet of Ministers realize that avoiding tough battles over the draft budget
would be a hard thing to do. Prime Minister Yushchenko publicly admitted that he did not count on the
Rada to pass the budget promptly.
Another facet of the budget theme relates to the future of this government in general and some of its
members in particular. The adoption of the budget by the parliament can be closely linked to reshuffles
in the Cabinet. The forecast is based on some noteworthy symptoms, including the uncertain position
of Minister of Finance Igor Mitiukov: while the Prime Minister is reportedly prepared to substitute
Mitiukov with somebody else, the President, reportedly, sees no adequately qualified alternative at the
moment.
Hence, this political season will be determined by two key issues: the debates over the 2001 state
budget and the high-profile implementation process. The two are logically linked in a sense that
positive conclusion of both of them required a more or less consolidated parliamentary majority,
capable of coordination of obvious and hidden interests, ambitions and agendas of a variety of political
forces represented in the legislature. No wonder President Kuchma described the process of debates
over the 2001 budget, submitted by the government to the parliament on September 15, primarily as a
"political act" (Holos Ukrainy, September 21, 2000).
Similarly, the definition of "political act" (even with a capitalized "P") can be referred to the process of
implementation of the results of the national referendum of April 16, 2000. Although the parliament
engaged in the process in mid-summer, having voted on July 13 by 251 "yeah" for the President's draft
bill of amendments to the country's Fundamental Law, key issues remain unresolved, as the task of
securing approval of at least 300 MPs is almost as hard as it was in spring, no matter how much
strategists at the Presidential Administration wish it.
In order to finalize the implementation efforts and reach the target figure of 300, the initiators of this
"political act" need to gather 49 more voting cards, which is a far too hard thing to do. Besides
bargaining and political agreements, the implementation is largely dependent on inter-faction migration
and reshuffles that are under way and likely to occur in the near future. The implementation that has
been so vigorously discussed by some activists of the "majority" has been seriously challenged by the
problems within the "majority".
Oleksandr Volkov, one of the initiators of the referendum and implementation of its results into the
Ukrainian legislation has been quoted as noting that the steady majority in the Ukrainian parliament
lists only 160 to 165 MPs, for only six factions of the "majority" take part in the voting regularly
(Kievskiy Telegraf, September 18, 2000). Those include the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
(United), the Greens, the People's Democratic Party, the Trudova Ukraina and the Vidrodzhennya
Rehioniv. Therefore, according to Volkov, in order to make the sure the process is successful, the
centrists and the parliament's leadership will have to do homework on some left-wing factions.
However, the left-wingers are no more enthusiastic about the implementation process that before.
Ukrainian communists are still reluctant to support the implementation of the referendum results. One
of the faction's influential members Georgy Kriuchkov was quoted as arguing that "the Administration
will be unable to secure votes of 300 MPs that are necessary for the implementation. Therefore, [they]
will not manage to approve the draft bill on changes to the Constitution in the form that was proposed
by the President of Ukraine" (Kievskiy Telegraf, September 18, 2000).
The problem has yet another dimension. The traditional tension in the relations between the President
and the parliamentary "minority" has been manifested recently by an attempt to initiate the procedure
of impeaching President Kuchma undertaken by the parliament's "mafia fighters" Hryhory
Omelchenko, MP and Anatoly Yermak, MP. Shortly after the beginning of the new session they
presented the parliament with a draft resolution "On Initiating the Issue of Dismissing President of
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma from his Position through Impeachment and Creation of a Special Ad Hoc
Investigation Commission to Investigate Activities of Kuchma L.D. in the Capacity of Prime Minister
and the President of Ukraine". However, on September 14, 2000 the parliament voted down the draft
resolution and refused to include the hearing in the agenda for September 2000. Only 140 MPs voted in
favor of proceeding with the impeachment proposal. The parliamentary "majority" - Trudova Ukraina,
Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv, Solidarnist, United Social Democrats, Batkivshchyna, both People's Rukhs,
the PDP, the Greens and the Reformy-Kongres - either voted against it (64 votes) or abstained (4 votes)
or did not vote (121 votes). Yet, from the very beginning it was clear that the attempt was doomed for
political failure. On the eve of the voting, leader of Ukrainian communists Petro Symonenko
announced support for the Omelchenko-Yermak proposal, thus, having demonstrated that traditional
political focus of left-wingers underwent no change.
Instead, the beginning of the new political season was marked by major disarray in the parliamentary
"majority". The processes logically indicate further change in the structure of the parliamentary
"majority" and the struggle for the role of the political 'first violin" in that "orchestra". The tendencies
can be seen in migration of some MPs between factions and groups, and in slight but noteworthy
"weight loss" by some factions. Moreover, given this change in the parliament, the result of a regular
rotation of the leadership of the parliamentary "majority" and substitution of Leonid Kravchuk
(SDPU(o)) as its coordinator look rather symptomatic. On September 21, 2000, the majority of the 11-
faction "majority" (198 MPs out of 271) voted for passing the role of its coordinator (that de facto
makes its performer a top lobbyist in the parliament) to leader of the People's Democratic Party
Oleksandr Karpov. Other, less successful candidates for the role included Igor Sharov (Trudova
Ukraina), Oleksandr Pukhkal (Batkivshchyna) and the leader of the Ukrainian People's Rukh Yuri
Kostenko. Probably, harsh political "battles" within the majority may accompany the process of
selection of a deputy coordinator. Although both of the positions are informal and serve primarily
organizational purposes, they are very important as they enable their holders to influence the process of
agenda-forming and decision-making. The choice in favor of specific political forces within the
"majority" will serve as an indicator of further development of inter-faction trends and attitudes to the
future of this government and the process of implementation of changes to the constitution.
While almost all centrist factions and groups have been affected by inter-faction migration, some of the
moves indicate efforts to re-group forces and re-shape spheres of influence within the parliament. For
instance, former head of the Naftogaz Ukrainy Igor Bakai (who had won his seat in the by-election on
June 25, 2000 at the constituency No. 64 of the Zhytomyr region) left the pro-government Reformy-
Kongress faction and joined Oleksandr Volkov's "Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv". The faction got yet
another new recruit: Pavlo Ryabikin, a businessman who had also won his seat in the recent by-election
at the constituency No. 130 of the Mykolayiv region. Due to the new recruits, the 37-strong
"Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv" became the parliament's third largest faction.
The "Trudova Ukraine" group, recently joined by newly-elected MP, Yaroslav Sukhyi, former deputy
director general of the Motor-Sich plant, (constituency No. 78 of the Zaporizhya region) now numbers
45 MPs and is the second largest entity in the parliament. The 115-strong Communist party's faction,
recently joined by former Vice Speaker Adam Martyniuk, remains the most numerous one, but its
influence has been severely undermined by its "minority" status and the loss of control of all
committees as a result of the January 2000 "velvet revolution" in the parliament.
Some of the factions suffered minor losses, slight but poignant, and demonstrative of the dynamics of
political processes linked to reduction of power and influence of some political actors. The People's
Democratic faction lost two members - leaders of the Christian Democratic party of Ukraine Vitaly
Zhuravsky and Serhiy Kyrychenko. Long ago (in relative terms), in April 1998, the PDP faction was
the second most numerous (after the Communists) faction in the new parliament, and numbered 70
MPs, 40 of which were not members of the party. The non-partisan recruits represented a number of
parties that lost the election (like 4 members of the Agrarian party) or businessmen who won seats in
majoritarian constituencies. By early May 1998 the faction membership had grown to 85. However, at
a certain stage the party and the faction began losing influence, primarily due to the loss of access to
the so-called "administrative resource" available through affiliation of a number of regional and local
executive officials with the "party of power". The break-up of the wing led by Anatoly Matvienko
(later on, the leader of Sobor and vehement opponent to Leonid Kuchma's political course) and the
parliament's refusal to approve the re-appointment of Valery Pustovoitenko after Leonid Kuchma's
second presidential victory further undermined the party's influence. The election of Ivan Pliushch as
the Speaker by the "majority" in January, and the recent election of Oleksandr Karpov as the "majority"
coordinator may indicate rather successful efforts of the PDP to restore its influence, even though
reaching the past influence of the former "party of power" in full would be hardly possible now. More
likely, the election of Karpov represents a compromise within the "majority" rather than signifies a
tendency of increasing the PDP's role in the Ukrainian political environment.
Some losses have been suffered by Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna faction, "deserted" in early
September by former Acting Attorney General of Ukraine Oleg Lytvak and former deputy chairman of
the Committee for fighting organized crime and corruption Victor Razvadovsky, who had "migrated"
earlier from the PDP and the SDPU(o) factions. The fact can be interpreted as an indicator of shrinking
influence of Vice Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who once started the Batkivshchyna from the wreckage
of Pavlo Lazarenko's once powerful Hromada, which she reportedly had broken up. The formation of
the Batkivshchyna was announced in the parliament on March 4, 1999, shortly after Pavlo Lazarenko
was arrested in Switzerland. At that time the Batkivshchyna numbered 21 MPs, but now it is at risk of
repeating the ill fate of the Hromada.
Another noteworthy event was Oleksandr Lavrynovych's decision to join the Rukh (led by Hennady
Udovenko). A generally respected and potentially strong politician, Lavrynovych had remained in the
political "shadow" for about a year, but finally decided that his broad experience could be useful for
consolidation of the right-wing forces. A new stage of the stumbling consolidation process was
signified by the renewed talks between the leaderships of the two Rukhs and a meeting between
Hennady Udovenko and Yuri Kostenko. Though, it is still too early to look for any particular political
outcome of the renewed contacts.
Hence, nowadays the faction map looks as follows: besides the "giants" described above, on September
6, 2000 the SDPU(o) includes 33 MPs (while Victor Suslov left the faction, Ivan Boichuk joined in);
the Solidarnist lists 27 MPs; the Ukrainian People's Rukh (Kostenko) - 21 MP; the People's Rukh of
Ukraine (Udovenko) - 19 MPs; the Socialist party - 17 MP, and the Reformy-Kongres - 15 MPs.
Another noteworthy element of the parliament's life that can be seen as an indicator of the current
trends within the "majority" is the emergence of a new faction, "Yabluko", led by Mykhailo Brodsky,
ex-chairman of the Dendy concern, ex-co-owner of the Kievskie Vedomosti daily, and ex-
representative of the Pechersk borough council of Kyiv. Following the 1998 parliamentary election he
joined the Hromada, but left the faction in September 1999. At the end of November 1999 Brodsky
announced that a new parliamentary group, "Yabluko", would be established in early December, and
claimed that 11 MPs were willing to join. However, the desired result was achieved only in mid-
September 2000, when the emergence of the new 14-member "Yabluko" faction was formally
announced in the parliament. The most noteworthy detail is the recruitment by the faction of a former
Socialist and then member of the SDPU(o), Victor Suslov - the politician who had chaired the
parliamentary commission for investigation of activities of the National Bank of Ukraine then led by
Victor Yushchenko. The commission's materials later inspired the investigators of the NBU case and
coincided with the major charges addressed to the NBU by the IMF. Given the long record of Mr.
Suslov's special attitude to Victor Yushchenko, the new "Yabluko" may be unlikely to be supportive of
this government's policy. At one of the faction's first press conferences, on September 18, 2000, the
"Yabluko" leaders poignantly remarked that "the Prime Minister of Ukraine, reporting about results of
his work to citizens, speaks mainly about his populist resolutions, but does not focus on the looming
problems" (Kievskie Vedomosti, September 19, 2000). Apparently, the issue of lobbying staff
reshuffles in the government may be seen as critical by the "Yabluko". From the very start, member of
the "Yabluko" and Brodsky's long-term backer Victor Chaika publicly announced that "nowadays we
would propose two well-prepared ministers and two well-prepared governors [for the position of] the
Prime Minister in the future in order to work in a team" (Stolichnye Novosti, September 19, 2000).
Such statements give reason to doubt about the degree of support for the budget, proposed by
Yushchenko, and other government-sponsored draft bills. Since no time framework was given by the
"Yabluko" leadership for "the future", it is likely that the relevant political forces are already fully
prepared for the race.
On the other hand, there is no need to overestimate the strength and importance of the "Yabluko" lobby
in the parliament. Rather, such views and declared interests may serve as good indicators for further
polarization of the forces in the parliament, and primarily the "majority" regarding the government.
Under the burden of key tasks, the "majority" is undergoing the major "multi-vectored" identity crisis.
The conditional and unsteady entity that was once planned as a political monolith finds it increasingly
difficult to ignore the presence of a pro-government group that is likely to support this government and
Victor Yushchenko personally whatever the political change. The core of this group may be formed by
the Batkivshchyna, both of the Rukh factions, the Reformy-Kongres, part of the PDP and part of the
Greens. Some signs of the polarization can already be seen: for instance, the growing internal tension in
the "majority" with regard to its attitude to the government may be illustrated by the refusal of the
above factions to support the recent initiative of the "Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv" and the SDPU(o) to
summon the top government officials to the parliament and make them answer some unpleasant
questions about the situation in the country's fuel and energy complex.
Hence, while most of the above make only a sketch of the broad picture of the Ukrainian parliament,
currently it displays trends to polarization of the centers of influence, and the "majority" suffers from
the trend like never before.
